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THE DOCTRINE OF NEGLIGENCE.'
Negligence, as a ground of legal responsibility, signifies a case of
failure to do at all, or failure to do in a proper manner some act
which it was the duty of the alleged delinquent to perform; by which
failure the right of the party to whom the duty related was injured.
In its popular, and in its ordinary legal acceptation, the term neg-
ligence is applied only to cases of mere omission, in which no wilful
purpose to do wrong is supposed. A methodical digest of the law
upon this subject will be attempted in the following pages;
The experience of every lawyer will verify the observation,'that
among all the questions brought before our courts, none are of more
common occurrence, and none more apt to be perplexing, than those
which turn on the'negligence of one or the other party or the con-
current negligence of both parties in the case at bar. Upon no
subject has the genius of our modern jurisprudence developed more
complex and nice distinctions; and I think, it may be safely ad-
ded, no distinctions in the whole range of our jurisprudence are
more disconnected and confused. The employments and relations
of life in commercial communities are diversified into an almost
infinite variety. To different employments and different relations,
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a graduated standard of duty has been applied. To some of these
it has been deemed the policy of civil justice to apply a rigorous ;
to others a less rigorous; to others an indulgent rule of care,
attention or skill. The discreet application of this standard in the
adjudication of causes, must always demand from those concerned
in them a vigilant and comprehensive criticism. No lawyer is
competent for this task who has not had occasion to make the
whole doctrine, in its widest scope, a subject of thorough and sys-
tematic study. An essay to gather into one harmonious text the
disconnected threads of principle running through a vast multitude
of occasional adjudications, if at all successful, must serve to facili-
tate his inquiries.
But little novelty will be expected, either in definition, reasoning
or illustration; and but little beyond the most guarded and diffident
criticism, of any doctrines, which seem to have the sanction of a
preponderating weight of authority, would be tolerated by the
profession.
The real aim of such an essay should be to collect the principles
relating to the subject into a methodical order, and in a perspi-
cuous form; tracing the system back to the radical truths from
which its practical doctrines originate ; collecting into one connected
view the decisions of many courts; furnishing in the case of con-
tradictory authorities, data for comparison and judgment; and thus
affording to the student the advantage of a convenient, expeditious,
and orderly view of the subject.
Negligence must always be a question of fact, and almost always
for the determination of a jury. Besides the accidental similitudes
and analogies to be met with in reported cases, the lawyer's
library can furnish him but little aid in the trial of such ques-
tions. It may at once be pronounced impracticable to invent
specific tests of negligence ; or in other words to contrive formulas
for the various degrees of care incumbent on men in various situa-
tions. The thing to be done is to give to those, whose office it
is to conduct such investigations, a ready, assured, easy and per-
suasive use of the few general principles which is all that legal
science can bestow upon its ministers.
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Negligence, according to the above definition, is always a case of
failure to fulfil a duty. The duties, legal as well as moral, which
man owes to his fellow man, grow out of his nature and relations
in life. They may be classified sufficiently for our present pur-
pose, as those which are assumed by express contract; those which
are specially prescribed by statute ; and those which are annexed
by implication to certain employments, relations, conditions or
occasions in human affairs. A duty, when predicated of any per-
son in any case, signifies that he is legally bound in respect to the
rights of some other person touching the particular subject matter,
to do or not to do some certain thing, affecting the enjoyment of
those rights. This idea of action or abstinence from action, which
is involved in every supposition of duty, implies, by necessity, the
POWER of the agent to act or abstain from action as the case may
be. This easily conducts us to the truth, that every duty enjoined
by law must be founded on and measured by the power of the agent
to perform it; not always the power he may chance to possess in
his own person, but sometimes such as he could and should avail
himself of from extrinsic sources. Very few, indeed, of our social
duties could be fulfilled by the sole agency of our own personal
faculties. This fundamental truth will be found to consist* with
every view of the subject. A man may contract to do an impossi-
ble thing. If impossible in the nature of things, the contract is
absurd and void. If impossible only to the contracting party,
under the circumstances of the case, it is regarded as his own folly
to incur such an obligation. The other party is not necessarily
presumed to know that the act was not feasible; and hence, though
in strictness it cannot be said that it is his duty to do a thing im-
possible for him to do, it was still his duty to ascertain and know,
before making the contract, whether he could perform it; and, at
all events, it may be affirmed as his duty in: such a case, to com-
pensate the contractee for the damages of non-performance. So,
if after the making of the contract, it becomes impossible, from
causes beyond his control and not imputable to his own agency, the
duty to do the specific thing proposed of course ceases; but this
does not, by necessary consequence, exonerate him in all cases from
.the duty of paying the damages.
THE DOCTRINE OF NEGLIGENCE.
We have said that the idea of duty is always founded on the sup-
position of power or capacity to fulfil it. This proposition does
not mean, that in any individual case, a court is to analyse the
faculties of the individual agent ; measure their extent; and adjust
the standard of legal duty by that measure. The economy of hu-
man justice forbids this. It is required to operate through the in-
strumentality of general laws; in other words, to apply an uniform
rule to cases which are not uniform but diverse in their circum-
stances. It vindicates itself from blame for occasional and
frequent instances of injustice only by pointing to the general
aggregate of its results. The proposition means, that the defini-
tions of duty in the jurisprudence of the State are framed not with
reference to particular individuals, but to the whole community,
considered generically as an indefinite number of human beings;
and, hence, those definitions are based on a general hypothesis of
human capacity.
Man is endowed by his Creator with certain corporeal, moral and
intellectual faculties, composing what we call his nature; and this
is the ground work of all his social dluties. A very brief exposi-
tion of this idea will suffice. He has senses for the perception of
physical objects; the capacity and instincts for observation ; pas-
sions, affections, habits; he has curiosity, fear, confidence, memory,
judgment, and by the aid of all these, he has in some measure fore-
knowledge of future consequences. He understands the operations
of physical causes ; the principles which govern the elements; the
succession of the seasons; the processes of vegetation; the pheno-
mena of the heavens; the instincts and habits of animals; the
physical and social conditions under which he lives; the ordinary
course of human affairs ; the nature of mechanical agencies, and the
faculties, instincts, and habits of our own race. Experience teaches
him that certain causes must, that certain other causes probably
will, and that certain others possibly may/ produce certain effects.
But his resources of knowledge are not circumscribed within his
own circle of observation. By the aid of a professional education,
and consulting the focal lights of science and art, he is sometimes
enabled to trace the chain of causation far beyond the common
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limit; to foresee remote contingencies and guard against dangers,
yet distant and dormant, by seasonable and apt precautions. From
the dictates of his own moral sense, or from the express law of the
State, he knows his own rights and duties, and the corresponding
rights and duties of his neighbor. His civil responsibilites are
developed from and proportioned to these endowments. He is bound
to act, because he knows how to act. It is because he apprehends,
or must be supposed to apprehend the approach of impending evils,
and has it within his power to avoid or prevent them, that natural
justice pronounces the practice of suitable care, circumspection, and
prudence to be his duty.
But this duty, as a question for legal adjudication, always sup-
poses .the agent, who is chargeable with it, to stand in relation with
some other party, to whom it is owing. The degree of care required
of any one is based on the hypothesis, that all other parties are
equally able, and, therefore, equally bound to exercise due care and
prudence on the occasion. The one who is charged with the obli-
gation, and the one who claims it, are both supposed to be in pos-
session of the same rational faculties. Hence the duty alleged, in
any case, is moulded by reference to the concurrent'duties of all
others concerned in the subject matter; and hence the familiar
maxim of our courts, so unfailingly repeated in the trial of actions
on the case, that the plaintiff, in order to recover for the negligence
of the defendant, must himself appear to be free from negligence,
proximately contributing to the injury.
Prudence is to be maintained in every theory of civil justice as
an universal duty of man, without regard to the position of superior
right in which he may happen to stand. Even when the victim of
malicious wrong, he is not excused from an obligation inherent in
his nature as an intelligent being ; and to which his instincts must
always prompt him. The great first object of all law is to prevent
injury-the next to circumscribe its effects. This failing, it offers
its feeble and too often ineffectual aid for redress. In the preven-
tion of wrong, it must call on human prudence in every juncture,
as its most potent auxiliary. It commands even the blameless suf-
ferer, while under the hands of the wilful wrong-doer, to use those
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means of self-protection which are in his power, as if he was con-
scious of no law promising reparation. And thus we see that the
fundamental idea, from which the whole doctrine of negligence is
deduced, is, that reasonable care is an universal duty of all men in
all cases and in all relations-a duty not superseded, but only
assisted by the law.
We find, however, that, in the progressive refinement of juris-
prudence, it has come to recognize distinctions in the measure of
care or skill-to be exacted in different cases. For instance, a gra-
tuitous bailee is held to exercise but little more than the minimum
degree, just above the undefined but supposable point, where negli-
gence ends and fraud begins. On the other hand, a common car-
rier is held responsible for the very maximum of the scale, and con-
sidered almost as an insurer in its broadest sense. If one party be
found in a position of legal right on the occasion of the accident in
question, the comparative responsibilities of the parties are marked
always with attentive reference to this relation. If a person employ,
in the course of his business, agencies of a dangerous nature, he is
sometimes held liable for a want of skill and precaution, coming
little short of prescience. A distinction is observed between pri-
vate agents and public" officers ; between private corporations and
such as are of a public character ; and of the latter, commonly de-
nominated municipal, between those which are created by special
charter, and those which exist by the constitution and laws of the
State, and not by the supposed will of the inhabitants. In some ad-
judications of respectable authority, though not yet standing above
the reach of controversy at the bar, where the victims of accident
have been children, incapable of discretion from their extreme
youth, the scale of care has been adjusted to the exigencies of the
case, and the person, having under his control the agency of in-
jury, held liable for a degree of prudence sufficient to guard against
the lack of it in the person injured.
But, after taking a full view of all the distinctions to be found in
the books, the radical truth will be found underlying all, that, in
every vicissitude of life, every man is bound, in avoiding the evils
which beset Ls path, to exercise that degree of prudence which is
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within the compass of his capacity, and which is rationally dic-
tated by the occasion. The economy of human justice, the princi-
ples of a sound morality, and the instincts of our nature, alike sug-
gest and enjoin this rule.
It is not obvious to a cursory glance, how any distinctions, in the
degree of care to be used in avoiding injury, would be maintainable
under this rule. After saying that we are all required to practice
proper prudence in our conduct, it might seem, that any attempt at
graduating this cardinal and universal duty must be essentially
arbitrary. But, on further reflection, it will be seen, that, though
the scale may not always have been accurately marked, and though
sometimes an impracticable degree of precision may have been at-
tempted, yet, after all, this plan of graduation is simply an appli-
cation, by the lights of practical experience of the general principle
stated, to various classes of cases and various classes of social rela-
tions.
The weight of duty, obviously, is not always the same. When
assumed by voluntary and express contract, its obligation, of course,
is modified by the terms of the contract. The nature of the sub-
ject matter, the consideration, the probability of danger, the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties, and the prevailing usage at the
time and place, are all to be considered as elements in the calcula-
tion. If the contract be made by persons in a. particular employ-
ment, public policy, founded upon a comprehensive range of con-
siderations, may havd dictated a peculiar rule of duty, as in the
case of common carriers. But the law always supposes, that the
care and skill it requires is within the presumable capacity of the
party; and that the occasion reasonably called for its exercise.
The duties, which are of legal cognizance, we have distinguished
as those which are created by express contract; those which are
prescribed by statute, as regulations of municipal policy; and those
which are implied by law in certain employments, relations, condi-
tions and occasions. It is manifest, on a little consideration, that
in this inquiry we shall have no concern with those duties which
exist only by force of specialagreement between the parties. Be-
cause, when the particular act to be done, and the- mode of doing
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it are explicitly pointed out in the agreement, a breach of its stipu-
lations, whether a misfeasance or a nonfeasance, must be regarded
as wilful, and, therefore, not presenting the characteristic features
of negligence. If the mode of action be not specified, it is then
left as a question of rational construction by the rules of law, and
the case at once falls essentially under one or the other of the two
remaining classes. These two classes, moreover, for greater sim-
plicity, may be conjoined under one definition; and the duties em-
braced in them described as those duties, which the municipal law,
following the dictates of natural justice, declares to be incumbent
on all persons holding to each other certain relations, in a certain
state of circumstances.
As a duty always implies a correlative right, a clear exposition of
the rights to be protected must necessarily serve to demonstrate the
duties to be enforced by civil law.
The usual classification of rights is familiar to every student. It
may not be useless in this disquisition to attempt a more general
definition. The term "right " denotes that relation of exclusive
possession and enjoyment which any member.of a civil society holds
to any given object, instrument, or condition of good ; such relation
being consistent with the concurrent rights of all other members,
at the time, place and occasion supposed.
The idea of social relations and intercourse implies certain terri-
torial limits within which they are to take place; and, therefore,
proximity of location, and frequent contact between the individuals
composing the community. The- closer this proximity and the more
frequent this contact, the more multiplied will be the occasions of
interference or collisions in the daily pursuits of life. The condi-
tions of space for the enjoyment of rights by any given number of
persons, being thus limited, each is inevitably subjected to the pres-
sure and inconvenience of more or less restraint; and hence the
,maxim-sic utere tuo, ut alienum non keda. Every one must use
his own right so, that at the same time his neighbor may enjoy his.
